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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
R. J. PENMAN, 
Plaintiff amd Appellant, 
-vs.-
THE EIMCO CORPORATION, 
a. corporation, 
Defe·nda·nt and Respondent. 
Appellant's Brief 
Appeal from the District Court of the 
Third Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake County. 
The Honorable Clarence E. Baker, Judge. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
R. J. PEN~f.A_N, 
Plaintz~jj· and Appellant, 
-YS.-
THE EIMCO CORPORATION, 
a corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Appellant's Brief 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The plaintiff and appellant above brought this ac-
tion in the City Court of Salt Lake City, Salt Lake 
County, State .of Utah, to recover from the defendant 
and respondent the sum of $808.45, together with in-
terest from and since February 15, 1944, and plaintiff's 
costs, said sum alleged in the complaint to be due the 
plaintiff from the defendant for certain work performed 
by the plaintiff for the defendant at the Tooele Ord-
nance Depot in Tooele County, State of Utah. It is 
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alleged that the plaintiff was employed by the defendant 
to go to the Tooele Ordnance Depot to cut, load and 
haul in certain arch steel trusses that had been used as 
ceiling joists for ammunition igloos. The object of 
cutting the trusses at Tooele was so that they could get 
a larger freight load on the car so that the freight rate 
would be held down to a minimum and that in cutting 
the trusses into pieces it was necessary that plaintiff 
employ certain men with acetylene torches and that the 
cost of the cutting of the trusses was a total of $1563.50, 
and that there was owing on another account the sum 
of $84.55, which was admitted, making a total due of 
$1658.05 upon which account there had been paid the 
plaintiff the sum of $849.60, and that there was a bal-
ance due of $808.45, together with interest at the legal 
rate from and since the same became due. To the com-
plaint the defendant and respondent filed its answer 
admitting the allegations of paragraph 1 of the com .. 
plaint and alleging that the defendant became indebted 
to the plaintiff in the sum of $2,204.37 for the prepara-
tion and transportation of steel scrap from the Tooele 
Ordnance Depot to Salt Lake City, Utah, and denies 
the r~maining allegations, and in further ans,ver alleges 
that they advanced to the plaintiff in connection with 
the service $2,519.42 and denies that the defendant is 
indebted in any sum to the plaintiff, and then allege a 
counter-claim wherein they allege that the defendant 
employed the plaintiff to transport certain steel from 
the Tooele Ordnance Plant to the Salt Lake City plant 
of the defendant at the agreed price of $2.00 per ton, 
and that he entered upon said employment and earned 
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upon said eontraet thl} ~nun of $1()()9.82, and admit that 
thereaftpr the contrnrt W'HS modified in that the de-
fpndant agreed to pay the defendant a reasonable value 
for preparn tion of certain channel iron, a part of said 
sernp material, and that the plaintiff prepared the same, 
and that the reasonable Yalue of the preparation was 
the sum of $430.00, plus a sales commission of $84.55. 
That they then plead that pursuant to the contract the 
tlefendant adYaneed to the plaintiff the sum of $2,519.42, 
and that the same '\Tas $315.10 more than the sum earned 
by the plaintiff under the contract and then alleged that 
the plaintiff abandoned the contract and failed to finish 
the preparation and hauling of said scrap material. 
They then pray that the plaintiff take nothing by his 
complaint and that the defendant have judgment 
against the plaintiff for $315.10. 
STATEMENT OF FACT 
The plaintiff appeals from the judgment of the 
court denying the plaintiff recovery upon his said com-
plaint and granting the defendant judgment upon his 
counter-claim in the sum of $45.30. The facts in the 
case are as follows : 
The plaintiff who had been in times past employed 
by the defendant to do certain work for them was em-
ployed to haul from the Tooele Ordnance Depot to Salt 
I.Jake City to the defendant's place of business certain 
steel igloo arches at $2.00 per ton. The freight upon 
these shipments on -the railroad was 65c per ton based 
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upon a load of sixty thousand pounds. The plaintiff 
after shipping a few car loads found that he could only 
load fifteen tons on a car or thirty thousand pounds of 
weight. However, he was charged for the full capacity 
of the car and instead of paying freight on the amount 
loaded in the car was required to pay freight on double 
the amount loaded, or where the freight rate was 65c 
per ton for a full car load, it increased to $1.30 per ton 
for the amount the plaintiff could load in a car. After 
the trusses reached the place of business of the de-
fendant in Salt Lake City they were cut up into pieees 
with acetylene torches. This being a fact and being 
known by the plaintiff, he approached the man in charge 
for the defendant and requested that he be permitted 
to do the cutting of the trusses at the Tooele Ordnance 
Depot before they were loaded and in order that he 
could get a full load on a railroad car. This privilege 
was granted to the plaintiff by the defendant. However, 
no price was fixed at the time of the granting of the 
privilege to be paid for the cutting. The agreement to 
cut the igloos at the Tooele Ordnance Depot was a sepa-
rate contract between plaintiff and defendant and had 
nothing to do with and did not interfere with the $2.00 
per ton price for transporting it from the Tooele Ord-
nance Depot to the defendant's place of business at 
Salt Lake City, but 'vas a separate contract for doing 
the cutting. After this arrangement was made, the 
plaintiff went back to the Tooele Ordnance Depot 'vith 
several acetylene torch operators, together with the 
torches and cut up the igloo arches into pieces, if re-
quiring eight cuts to each arch, and during the cutting 
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proep~s tht' dl'fendant adv·nnced to tho plaintiff the sum 
of $849.60 for oxygen, employees' wages, etc. The 
amount rhnrged for rntting at the Tooele Ordnance 
Depot '"'as as follo"Ts : 
Aeetylene torrh operators, $3.00 per hour 
"Tith time and one-half for oYer time. That under 
this arrangement, there were 304 hours, amount-
ing to $91~.00 for the straight time and $283.50 
for the over time, a total of $1195.50. For the 
other labor performed there, the plaintiff charged 
at the rate of $2.00 per hour. (Tr. p. 8.) 
Then there was charged $25.00 per trip to 
Salt Lake City 'vith a truck to haul out supplies 
to do the cutting, for four trips, $100.00. (Tr. p. 
9) and $84.50 due on a commission, making a 
total due the plaintiff of $1658.05 on that par-
ticular job, of which sum the defendant paid 
$849.60, leaving a balance due the plaintiff from 
the defendant the sumof $808.45. (Tr. p. 10.) 
and for this amount the plaintiff sues the defendant. 
It ""as further sho,vn by the evidence that very 
shortly after all of the cutting was done at the Tooele 
Ordnance Depot, the defendant terminated the plain-
tiff's hauling contract so that he was unable to haul the 
material 'vhich he had cut down under the special eon-
tract. Upon the trial of this case the court found the 
issues against the plaintiff "no cause of action" and in 
favor of the defendant for $45.30. 
The case was first tried in the City Court of Salt 
Lake City and the court there rendered a judgment for 
the plaintiff and against the defendant for the sum of 
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$609.95, together with costs. From this judgment the 
defendant appealed to the Third Judicial District Court 
of Salt Lake County. Said Notice of Appeal having 
been served on the 6th day of February, 1947. On the 
28th day of May, 1947, the said Appeal had not been 
docketed with the Clerk of the District Court, although 
the same was transferred to the District Court of Salt 
Lake County on the 8th day of February, 1947, two 
days after the Notice of Appeal 'vas served and filed. 
On the 28th day of May, 1947, 108 days after the record 
reached the District Court of Salt Lake County, the 
plaintiff filed a motion with the District Court to dismiss 
the appeal for failure to docket the appeal within the 
statutory period of thirty days after the same was re-
ceived by the Clerk of the District Court, and upon the 
filing of this motion, the motion was granted and the 
court entered its order dismissing the appeal and 
directing the Clerk of the Court to return the files and 
records to the Clerk of the City Court of Salt Lake City. 
On the fifth day of June, 194 7, the defendant filed a 
motion to reinstate the appeal basing the motion upon 
the fact that the Clerk of the District Court had agreed 
to advise the defendant \Vhen the record reached his 
office and asking that the order of the court dismissing 
the appeal be set aside and the appeal be reinstated 
through the defendant's mistake, inadvertance and ex-
cusable mistake and neglect. All of which was never 
established or shown. Upon the filing of this motion 
the plaintiff then again filed an affidavit and motion for 
the dismissal of the appeal, and on the 16th day of June, 
1947, the court vacated its former order dismissing the 
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appeal and denied the plaintiff's affidavit and motion 
of June 11th to dismiss the appeal and permitted the 
defendant to file and docket the appeal in· the District 
Court. 
ASSIGN~IENTS OF ERROR 
Comes no'v the appellant and makes the following 
assignments of error upon ·w·hich he will reply for a 
reversal of judgment appealed from in this cause: 
1. That the court erred in making and entering 
its order vacating and setting aside its former order 
dismissing the appeal and in reinstating the action in 
the District Court and also erred in denying the de-
fendant's motion based upon affidavit served and filed 
June 11, 1947, to dismiss the appeal. 
2. The Court erred in denying the plaintiff judg-
ment in the trial of said action in the District Court 
and entering judgment in favor of the defendant in 
said case. 
3. The Court erred 1n denying plaintiff's motion 
for a new trial. 
ARGUMENT 
The evidence in this case shows 1n effect the fol-
lowing facts: 
That the plaintiff had for sometime previously and 
upon various occasions -been employed by the defendant 
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to do certain work for the defendant, and that the work 
in question was to haul some steel girder irons which 
had been made for the purpose of building roofs on the 
government igloos; that they were a sort of truss affair 
made with channel iron and were approximately 15 feet 
long and braced at the inner part. (Tr. 5.) That the 
intention was that these pieces of material were to be 
loaded into cars and shipped to Salt Lake City at $2.00 
per ton, the plaintiff paying 65c per ton freight, leaving 
him a net balance for handling the material of $1.35 per 
ton. It was shown that the cars could carry 30 tons or 
60,000 pounds, however, after shipping a few car loads 
the plaintiff found that he could only load 15 tons of 
material on the car, but would have to pay freight on 
a full 60,000 pound car which would increase his freight 
per ton to $1.30, leaving him only 7·0c per ton net on 
the material; that upon learning that he would lose 
money in the .operation, he approached the defendant,~ 
Mr. Rosenblatt of the defendant company, and entered 
into a contract with him to cut the channels before load-
ing so that he could get a full car load of 60,000 pounds 
on the car, to which Rosenblatt consented and agreed. 
(Tr. p. 6.) Pursuant thereto the plaintiff went ahead 
and cut 1960 of these trusses which included eight cuts 
to the truss ; that in doing this work it 'vas necessary 
for the plaintiff to hire three torch men and two other 
men to do the work advantageously; that the plaintiff 
agreed with the defendant that he would cut the material 
down on a time basis and would charge for time and 
material to cut the trusses down. (Tr. p. 7); that pur-
suant to that contract the acetylene torch men worked 
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304 hours and 63 hours oYer time, nnd that. the reason-
able value of said "~ork 'vas $3.00 per hour for the men 
,,~ith the mar hines for straight t inlP, "\vith time and one-
half for oYer time, or $4.50 per hour for the over time; 
that such amounted to $1195.50. That the reasonable 
Yalue for tht~ other t'vo men working "\Yas $2.00 per hour 
and. time and one-half for over time. (Tr. p. 8.) That 
there 'Yere four hours OYer time and that there would 
be l~i7 hours straight time; that he made four trips to 
Salt Lake City 'vith the truck to haul out acetylene and 
materials for use on the job at $25.00 per trip, a total 
of $100.00 for that work; that there "\vas $84.50 due to 
him as commission on another account. (Tr. p. 9.) 
This would make a total due to the plaintiff in the sum 
of $2519.42, and that on said job the defendant had ad-
vanced to the plaintiff the sum of $1658.05, leaving a 
balance due the plaintiff from the defendant of $808.45. 
(Tr. p. 10.) 
It seems that the defendant rendered a statement 
to the plaintiff, marked "Exhibit A" in 'vhich it "\Vas 
shown on advances, on the cutting down job that there 
was money due the defendant from the plaintiff on this 
contract, and that that amount figures $1658.05, which 
the plaintiff subtracted from the amount due him of 
$2466.50, and leaving the same balance of $808.45. ( Tr. 
p. 11.) There is a discrepancy in the account of $52.92, 
but the evidence does not disclose what it consists of. 
The defendant upon cross examination attempted 
to illicit from the plaintiff that he agreed to cut the 
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irons in the field at the same price the defendant could 
cut them in the shop at Salt Lake City, to which the 
plaintiff answered, "I didn't say as cheap. I said we 
could cut them with a torch out there.'' ( Tr. P· 16.) 
That there were eight cuts made on each truss. (Tr. P· 
18.) That the plaintiff paid for the acetylene used on 
the job $133.00 to $140.00. (Tr. p. 22.) That there was 
no pipe on the channel. (Tr. p. 24.) 
On redirect examination, the plaintiff testified that 
the regular price for cutting material with acetylene 
torches was $3.00 per hour and that was true of the 
local shops in Salt Lake City; that after he got all of 
the arches cut up and ready to ship, he \Vas taken off 
the job by the defendant and was not permitted to haul 
the material into Salt I__Jake City, and that he was de-
prived not only of the extra money due him for the 
cutting but for his profit in hauling of the same also. 
( Tr. p. 26.) That the trusses had to he cut either at 
Tooele on the job or here in Salt Lake City. (Tr. p. 27.) 
G. HENRY STARTUP, a witness for the plaintiff, tes-
tified as follows : 
That he was a practical engineer and engaged in 
buying and selling, government surplus. That in 1944, 
he was working for the Monsey Iron and Steel Company 
as a practical engineer; that he is familiar with the 
operation of acetylene torches, and that all jobs in Salt 
Lake City regulated by the OP A was $3.00 per hour as 
the prevailing price, which included men and equip-
ment. (Tr. p. 28.) He further testified that \\'"ork out 
10 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
in the fit.?ld, as \Yns done on these trusses at Tooele, \VHR 
diffprent and that a man in a shop at Salt Lake City could 
do t\vo to three times as much entting ns he could out in 
the field "There tlH•se trusses \Yt•re cut, and he again testi-
fies that $3.00 per hour \vould be a reasonable sum for 
such rutting. and that his statement of the price per hour 
for such \York in Snlt I_.ake City in the shops in 1944 when 
this ''?ork ,,·as done "Tonld be $3.00 per hour. (T. p. 29.) 
The defendant then called a Rufus Erickson as a 
witness who testified that he was a material cutter for 
the Eimco Corporation in Salt Lake City and has been 
sinee 19:28; that he had cut a good many of the trusses 
in question; that he has cut up in the shop 130 trusses 
in an eight hour shift, but that he made three less cuts 
on each truss than was made by the plaintiff in this 
case. ( Tr. p. 33.) That he works on a regular basis c,f 
95c per hour in the shop with everything furnished him. 
To which question and answer the plaintiff made an 
objection \vhich was overruled by the Court. Upon 
cross examination the witness testified that he was paid 
time and one-haif for over time and Sundays, and that 
everything \vas furnished him including all material, 
torches, oxygen and everything necessary to make the 
cuts in the shop. ( Tr. p. 36.) 
A. H. HoLTMAN, a witness for the defendant, testi-
fied as follovvs: 
That he \vas engaged 1n buying and preparing 
scrap iron for melting purposes. (Tr. p. 36.) That when 
asked \\rhat \\7 0uld be a reasonable cost value on an 
11 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
hourly basis on the cutting, the witness answered. "I 
guess that would vary. If he paid his man $3.00 an hour, 
which I thought was high; I was hiring men cheaper 
at that time. What were you paying your men~ I was 
paying my men $1.20 an hour." (Tr. p. 38.) 
When the witness was asked upon cross examina-
tion if he had ever cut any of these trusses, he answered 
that he never did. He testified that if the pipes \vere 
full of oil and scale iron, they would be more difficult 
to cut, and when asked how much more difficult, stated 
that would be hard to say. (Tr. p. 39.) 
It will be noted that in this man's testimony on 
page 37 and again on page 39, the transcript has been 
changed with a red penciL We deem that this change 
was unauthorized and "re are unable to determine how 
a reporter could have mistaken the words he wrote in 
the transcript for the red pencil corrections, and we 
assume that the reporter got the testimony correct from 
the witness. 
Upon redirect examination the witness testified 
that it would take twenty minutes to cut up one truss, 
and that he was mistaken when he said it would take 
ten minutes, but on further redirect examination he did 
not seem to know anything about the matter in question. 
(Tr. pages 42 and 43.) 
SIMON RosENBLATT, a witness for the defendant testi-
fied as. follows : 
''That he is an official of the Eimco Corporation, 
being the secretary thereof; that he manages scrap iron 
12 
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and snlYag-e for said company; that he had known the 
plaintiff for eight or ten years, and that during that 
time they had a. number of contracts with him. That he 
entered into a contract with the plaintiff to haul ma-
terial from the Tooele Ordnance Depot at Tooele to the 
company's place of business at $2.00 per ton. That at 
the suggestion of the plaintiff, he was permitted to cut 
up the pipe at the field in order that he might haul a 
greater load on the cars; that he agreed to the arrange-
ment, but in telling the plaintiff to go ahead and that 
they would make an extra allowance to him when the 
job was finished, but it would be based upon their own 
costs in their O\Vll yard. At his counsel's suggestion he 
said that he would not allow the plaintiff to do the 
cutting if the cost \Vas greater than in the defendant's 
O"\\ ... n yard. (Tr. p. 47.) That they advanced money to 
him every Saturday to meet his payroll and pay his 
bills. ( Tr. p. 48.) Plaintiff's Exhibit No. '' 1 '' was then 
sho\\ ... 11 to the ,, ... itness. (Tr. p. 49.) At. which time the 
witness was asked the follo\\ring questions and made the 
follo\ving ans\vers. 
"Q. Did you have any discussion with him 
then concerning the last line which appears on 
there, 'special allo\vance yet to be made for 
cutting channel pipes' 1 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. What was the purpose of that discus-
sion~ 
A. I told him at that time we would arrive 
at some mutual understanding, just what he was 
entitled to for that payment. 
13 
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Q. Did you have any discussion 1n dollars 
and cents what that should be. 
A. Not at that time, no. 
Q. Did he ever submit a statement to you 
what he thought he would be entitled to for the 
cutting .of pipes~ 
A. Never. 
Q. Never submitted any statement to you 
at all~ 
A. No, never. 
Q. Did you have any further discussion 
with Mr. Penman concerning the fair and reason-
able value for cutting these pipes between Febru-
ary 15, 1944, the date of Exhibit ''A'' and the 
time the suit started~ 
A. No, he had never been around." (Tr. 
pages 50 and 51.) 
That the arrangement with Mr. Penman became at 
an end because he wasn't delivering the tonnage, and 
that they had to have scrap in their yard for his custo-
mers; that he told the plaintiff that, and that was about 
the time that he handed him the statement. (Tr. p. 52.) 
On cross examination the witness testified that after 
the trusses were cut up at Tooele, the plaintiff was taken 
off the j~b by the defendant, his contract being termi-
nated; that when this contract for cutting was made 
with the plaintiff he told him that the job would be based 
upon the Salt Lake shop price basis, but that it was 
never discussed between them as to what that cost was. 
(Tr. p. 54.) That the witness then testified that he was 
14 
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sent a letter by an attorney for the plaintiff and that 
the attorney came 'vith the plaintiff to his office and 
later talked to the 'Yitness about this very matter in 
eontroversy, and that in that discussion he refused to 
pay the money demanded but did not offer to pay any-
thing different than that demanded or to indicate to the 
plaintiff ,,·hat his claims were concerning· the account. 
(Tr. p. 56.) The "·itness then testified as follows: 
"Q. But you knew this work was being done 
out there by ~[r. Penman, didn't you 1 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you agreed to it 1 
A. I can't answer that yes or no. 
Q. I am not asking that ; I am asking 
'Yhether you agreed on a price~ 
A. I told him if he wanted to cut some pipes 
out there to his O\Vn advantage, to go ahead and 
do it. 
Q. You intended to pa.y him for it? 
A. I told him I would. 
Q. You intended to pay a reasonable value 
for it~ 
A. Not the kind of profit set out there. 
Q. I didn't ask that question; you intended 
to pay a reasonable value for it~ 
A. Based on our cost of cutting it in our 
own yard. 
Q. You certainly wouldn't expect me to do 
it and pay more than we could do it in our own 
yard, would you~ 
15 
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Q. Who was present~ 
A. Just he and I." (Tr. p. 57.) 
The defendant then closed its case and the plaintiff 
was called back for another question. He was asked: 
"Q. Mr. Penman, I will ask you whether or 
not during any conversation you had with Mr. 
Rosenblatt concerning this matter, if he ever told 
you the amount they would pay would be based 
on their costs in the shop there~ 
A. No, he didn't. 
Q. Not at any time~ 
A. No. 
Q. Was there ever anything said about the 
price~'' 
A. No." (Tr. p. 58.) 
Concerning the dismissal of the appeal, it will be 
noted that the court entered an order dismissing the 
same without the motion having been served upon the 
adverse party. An application was made to recall the 
order, and when that matter was heard and the appli-
cation recalled because of no notice, the plaintiff then 
filed another motion to dismiss the appeal which motion 
had been duly served upon the defendant in the action. 
The court denied that motion. 
It will be noted that the transcript of the City Court 
of the record had been in the District Court lying there 
and not filed for a period of four months, and the de-
fendant in support of his motion filed an affidavit set-
ting forth the ground upon which his motion would be 
16 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
based, 'vhirh affidavit rPrited the purported grounds 
for the position of the plaintiff in the matter, and in 
that affidavit he recites that the fee was paid to the 
Clerk of the City Court on the appeal on the 7th day of 
February, 1947: that the clerk of the District Court 
failed to notify the attorneys for the defendant when 
the record "Tas received from the Clerk of the City 
Court, and that the docketing fee was not paid because 
no request or notire had been received from the Clerk 
of the District Court according to agreement and failure 
to pay the fee 'vas due to the mistake, inadvertance and 
excusable mistake by the attorneys for the defendant. 
Just 'vhy the plaintiff in the action had to be charged 
"Tith an agreement between the defendant and the Clerk 
of the District Court we have been unable to determine, 
and the affidavit does not enlighten us. Neither does 
the affidavit state what constituted the mistake, inad-
vertance and excusable neglect by the attorneys for the 
defendant. Only carelessness eould be responsible for 
their neglect to docket the appeal as these men have been 
practicing law for a good many years and undoubtedly 
\vere familiar with the rules of the court in taking ap-
peals, and the plaintiff submits that the affidavit was 
not sufficient to justify the court in denying the plain-
tiff's motion to dismiss the appeal. The plaintiff had al-
ready paid the cost of docketing the appeal for the pur-
pose of its dismiS'sal. 
The question then ar1ses, if the court in its dis-
cretion can permit a party appealing a case from the 
City Court to the District Court to pay the filing fee 
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for the docketing of the appeal in the District Court 
four months after the papers have reached the District 
Court on the appeal, and after a motion had been ma.qe 
to dismiss the appeal, and pursuant to said motion the 
docketing fee had been paid for such purpose, without 
any· showing upon the part of the party neglecting his 
appeal, then we ask the question how long can such a 
condition exist before one would be entitled to have 
an appeal dismissed~ If it can go on for four months, 
we see no reason why it then could not be increased to 
twenty-four months or even more, if the court happened 
to be extra discretionary at the time the application 
was made. We cannot conceive that the law permits 
such a procedure. The statute is rather spceific in the 
time allowed for this purpose, and we would assume 
that some extraordinary situation must exist to relieve 
an appellant of such a situation, such as perhaps the 
illness of the attorney for the appealing party or so~e 
other situation that could not with reasonable diligence 
be remedied. We cannot conceive that this court's dis-
cretion can relieve a party under the circumstances 
existing in this case. 
In the case of I_Jittle vs. Blank, this court reveiwed 
this particular situation in 31 Utah 222 at 227, as fol-
lows: 
''The statute expressly provides that, on mo-
tion, appeals may be dismissed when the papers 
were not filed and the advance fee required there-
for was not paid within thirty days after the 
t~a~script 'vas received by t~e clerk. This pro-
VIsion of the statute was evidently intended to 
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insure promptness in 1 he filing· of the papers in 
cases appealed in order that such cases may be 
brought to trial in the district court without un-
necessary or unreasonable delay. If the rule 
. contended for hy appellant should obtain, the 
party appealing 'Yonld have it in his power to 
either indefinite!~~ postpone the trial of the case 
in the district court or force the respondent to 
file the papers in that court and pay the advance 
fee required by la"', and thereby, in effect nullify 
the provisions of section 3750 under considera-
tion.'' 
Again in the case of Hoffman Y. Lewis, 87 Pac. 167 
a.t 170, "?e have the follo,~ving: 
''In view of the foregoing, we will now pro-
ceed to examine into the petitioner's rights under 
the law giving appeals from justices' courts. Such 
appeals are purely statutory, and the statutes 
granting them must in all respects be at least 
substantially complied with. The appeal in this 
case \Yas dismissed upon the ground that the 
sureties did not justify respecting their qualifi-
eations, as required by law. Section 3747, Revised 
Statutes of 1898. '' 
We submit then that in this case the court abused 
its discretion in denying the plaintiff's motion to dis-
miss the appeal after plaintiff had paid the cost of filing 
said papers for such purpose, and had made a motion 
to the court to dismiss the appeal. 
Now, concerning the main ease, it appears that there 
is not any la\v involved in the case or perhaps we better 
say the law is very well settled concerning the matter 
invoh"ed, and that is, does the evidence adduced at the 
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trial of the case justify the decision of the court in 
denying the plaintiff's right to recovery and granting 
a judgment against the plaintiff in favor of the de-
fendant. 
It will be noted that the evidence of the plaintiff in 
fixing the ·amount of money earned is rather definite, 
that is, as to the time he put in with his hired men and 
equipment and under his figures it is shown that he had 
a balance due him upon the completion of the work of 
$808.45. (Tr. p. 10.) Mr. G. Henry Startup, a disin-
terested witness testified for the plaintiff and stated 
that he was definitely faimliar with prices paid upon 
the market for the kind of work performed by the plain-
tiff, and that he was also familiar with the OP A regu-
lation price on the work in question, and that it was 
$3.00 per hour. (Tr. p. 28). And the· particular work 
performed was submitted to the witness and he testi-
fied that $3.00 per hour was a very reasonable sum to 
be paid for that kind of work, and that it ·could not be 
done for that price at the time he was testifying. (Tr. 
p. 29.) This would be where the party who performed 
the work paid all of the cost incident thereto such as 
was done in this case. 
We have searched the testimony of the defendant 
in this case and we do not find any contradictory testi-
mony to this proposition in their evidence, and par-
ticularly all of the testimony of the defense was based 
upon days pay work by men in the shop on a steady 
salary or wage. 
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We, therefore, submit that the court erred in its 
decision and judgment in this case, and that the plain-
tiff is entitled to a reversal of the same and to a fur-
ther order of this court directing the district court to 
dismiss the plaintiff's appeal and remand the same back 
to the city court for execution of its judgment as ob-
tained therein. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. LEROY SHIELDS, 
Attorney for Pla.intiff. 
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